An Impermissible Punishment: The Decline of Consistency as a Constitutional Goal in Capital Sentencing by Oshman, Karen Appel
Pace Law Review
Volume 5
Issue 2 Winter 1985 Article 4
January 1985
An Impermissible Punishment: The Decline of
Consistency as a Constitutional Goal in Capital
Sentencing
Karen Appel Oshman
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Karen Appel Oshman, An Impermissible Punishment: The Decline of Consistency as a Constitutional
Goal in Capital Sentencing, 5 Pace L. Rev. 371 (1985)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss2/4
Notes and Comments
An Impermissible Punishment: The
Decline of Consistency as a Constitutional
Goal in Capital Sentencing
I. Introduction
In Furman v. Georgia,' the Supreme Court struck down
state statutes which had given juries unfettered discretion to im-
pose the death penalty. With Furman's declaration that certain
methods of imposing the death penalty were unconstitutional,
an eighth amendment due process analysis of the death penalty
was born. 2 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has strug-
gled to formulate and accommodate two requirements of a con-
stitutional capital sentencing process: measured consistent ap-
plication of the death penalty, and individualized consideration
of the accused. The result has been a bifurcated due process
analysis. To assure consistency, the Court has traditionally re-
lied upon statutory aggravating factors which limit and guide
sentencer discretion.3 To satisfy the goal of individualization,
the Court has focused upon sentencer consideration of all miti-
gating factors.4
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that constitu-
tional sentencing decisions require consistency and individuali-
zation. Recent cases, however, reveal that the Court is placing
decreasing emphasis upon consistency as a constitutional goal,
while upholding procedures that diminish the chance that con-
sistency can ever be achieved. Part II of this article traces the
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
2. See Note, The Bitter Fruit of McGautha: Eddings v. Oklahoma and the Need for
Weighing Method Articulation in Capital Sentencing, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 63 (1982).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 25-52.
4. See infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
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Court's due process analysis of capital punishment, focusing on
the Court's concern with the goals of consistency and individual-
ization. Part III examines the decline of consistency both as a
goal and as a possibility in the application of the death penalty.
Section A of Part III presents the Court's introduction of indi-
vidualization in the composition of aggravating factors. This new
element of individualization requires sentencer discretion on the
aggravating side of the sentencing equation, and cannot be rec-
onciled with the Court's mandate that aggravating factors be
consistently applied. Section B of Part III explores the Court's
approval of using nonstatutory aggravating factors in the sen-
tencing proceeding. These factors further reduce the likelihood
that the death penalty can be meted out with consistency. Fi-
nally, Section C of Part III analyzes the confusing overlap of ag-
gravating and mitigating factors. This is a problem that has oc-
cupied little of the Court's attention, although it injects yet
another element of arbitrariness into the sentencing procedure.
Part IV concludes that the Court has allowed its concern for in-
dividualization to engulf the requirement of consistency, and
that without this constitutionally mandated requirement of con-
sistency, death is an impermissible punishment.
II. The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment Due Process
Analysis
A. Furman v. Georgia
In 1971, in McGautha v. California,6 the Supreme Court re-
jected a fourteenth amendment due process challenge to capital
punishment. The Court refused to find that standardless jury
discretion resulted in the capricious and arbitrary imposition of
death. The Court noted the enormous difficulty in establishing
definitive standards and held that the untrammelled discretion
of the jury was not constitutionally intolerable.'
Despite McGautha's rejection of a fourteenth amendment
due process challenge to the death penalty, not all procedural
arguments were to be dismissed. One year later in Furman v.
5. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
6. Id. at 207.
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Georgia,7 the Court, relying on the eighth amendment, struck
down state death penalty statutes that gave juries unfettered
discretion.8 Each of the nine justices submitted a separate opin-
ion. While two justices held that the eighth amendment prohib-
ited the death penalty altogether, 9 three justices were unwilling
to hold the death penalty unconstitutional per se, and instead
filed process-oriented critiques of the death penalty statutes
before them. Justice Douglas ruled that the discretionary stat-
utes were "unconstitutional in their operation. They are preg-
nant with discrimination."" ° Justice Stewart, after emphasizing
the uniqueness and irrevocability of death, described the discre-
tionary statutes as "cruel and unusual in the same way that be-
ing struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."' He concluded
that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate
the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that
permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed."' 2 Justice White found the discretionary sentence in-
valid because it imposed the death penalty both infrequently
and inconsistently, thereby reducing its deterrent effect.
7. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
8. The statutes at issue gave juries absolute discretion to determine whether the
penalty for murder or rape would be death or a lesser punishment.
9. Id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas noted that under discre-
tionary statutes, juries and judges "have practically untrammeled discretion to let an
accused live or insist that he die." Id. at 248. Justice Douglas concluded that such un-
trammeled sentencer discretion violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, and the eighth amendment, because it resulted in arbitrary application of the
death penalty. He also felt that the death penalty was meted out in a discriminatory
fashion: "One searches our chronicles in vain for the execution of any member of the
affluent strata of this society." Id. at 251-52. This discriminatory process could not be
upheld: "discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection
of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual punishment.'" Id. at 257.
11. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 310. Although Justice Stewart was unwilling to rule capital punishment
unconstitutional per se, he felt that the discretionary statutes before him were invalid for
several reasons. In the first place, he saw the sentences as "cruel" under the eighth
amendment because they went beyond the state legislatures' determination of what was
necessary. Secondly, the sentences were "unusual" because infrequently imposed for
murder and rarely for rape. Finally, the sentences were both "cruel and unusual" be-
cause they were inconsistently applied. Although many others had been convicted of
rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, the petitioners were among "a capriciously selected
random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed." Id. at 309-
10.
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"[T]here is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases
in which [death] is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not."" The opinions of the concurring justices indicate that
death can be a cruel and unusual process when meted out dis-
criminatorily, arbitrarily and capriciously. In Furman v. Geor-
gia, an eighth amendment due process analysis of capital pun-
ishment was born.
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger resisted the Court's
eighth amendment due process approach. The eighth amend-
ment, he stressed, "is not concerned with the process by which a
State determines that a particular punishment is to be im-
posed";" in fact, "[tihe approach of these concurring opinions
has no antecedent in the Eighth Amendment cases."'15 Although
Chief Justice Burger accused the Court of overruling McGautha
"in the guise of an Eighth Amendment adjudication,"' 6 Mc-
Gautha in fact has never been explicitly reconsidered by the
Court.'" Thus the ghost of McGautha denies capital defendants
the traditional tools of due process analysis,' while encouraging
the Court to expand its formulation of an alternative eighth
amendment due process doctrine.'9
13. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Justice White reasoned that an infrequently
imposed death penalty could not be justified by reference to its deterrent effect: "I can-
not avoid the conclusion that as the statutes before us are now administered, the penalty
is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to be of sub-
stantial service to criminal justice." Id.
14. Id. at 397 (Burger, J., dissenting). The Chief Justice argued that concern about
the process of imposing the death penalty finds its source not in the eighth amendment,
but in the fourteenth amendment, under a procedural due process argument. And such
an argument, Chief Justice Burger concluded, had been foreclosed by the Supreme
Court's earlier decision in McGautha. Id. See supra notes 5 and accompanying text.
15. Furman, 408 U.S. at 399 (Burger, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger argued
that "[tihe Eighth Amendment was included in the Bill of Rights to assure that certain
types of punishment would never be imposed, not to channelize the sentencing process."
Id.
16. Id. at 400.
17. See Note, supra note 2 at 66 (concluding that the constitution requires the artic-
ulation of the weighing methods used by the sentencer in capital cases, and suggesting
guidelines and procedures for appellate court review).
18. Id.
19. The Court or controlling plurality has adhered to its eighth amendment process
analysis except in a few cases which do not raise critical capital sentencing issues. See
Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10-11, n.37 (1980). The cases which do
not employ an eighth amendment process rationale are Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349
(1977) (plurality opinion) (due process right to know information relied upon by sentenc-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss2/4
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B. The 1976 Death Penalty Cases and Their Legacy
The legislatures of thirty-five states responded to Furman's
ban on complete discretion in sentencing procedures by drafting
new statutes that sought to incorporate the procedural criteria
suggested in the concurring opinions of Furman.20 However, be-
cause of the plethora of opinions in Furman the resulting stat-
utes differed widely. Generally, the statutes took one of two
forms: (1) a mandatory death penalty statute, imposing death
for a certain specified category of crimes with no sentencer dis-
cretion, or (2) a guided discretion statute, giving the sentencer
discretion in imposing death but guiding such discretion through
the consideration of various aggravating and mitigating factors.21
Four years after Furman, in a group of decisions known col-
lectively as the 1976 death penalty cases, the Supreme Court ex-
panded its eighth amendment process analysis and addressed
constitutional issues raised by five of the post-Furman death
penalty statutes. 22 The Court upheld the guided discretion stat-
utes of Georgia, Florida and Texas, but struck down the
mandatory statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana. The Court
determined that the process used to impose death must comport
with " 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society,' ",23 standards which the Court saw re-
ing judge); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) (death penalty challenge based on ex
post facto and equal protection clause); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per
curiam) (invalidating hearsay rule exclusion of mitigating evidence); and Adams v.
Texas, 448 U.S 38 (1980) (invalidating death sentence because jurors were selected
improperly).
20. For details of the laws of the 35 states, see MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTA-
RIES, Part II, Comment to § 210.6 at 156-57 and nn. 144-48 (1980).
21. Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and
the Captial Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL. L.
REv. 317, 319-20 (1981).
22. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding Georgia's
guided discretion sentencing statute for the death penalty); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding Florida's guided discretion sentencing statute
in which aggravating circumstances are weighed against mitigating circumstances by the
sentencer); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding Texas' guided discretion
death penalty statute requiring the jury to find one statutory aggravating factor before
death could be imposed); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (invalidating North Carolina's statute making death mandatory for first degree
murderers); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (invalidating Louisiana's statute
making death mandatory for first degree murderers).
23. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
1985]
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flected in the decisions of legislatures and juries.24 The Court
then embarked upon a bifurcated due process analysis to estab-
lish and accommodate two crucial, and seemingly contradictory,
procedural goals: consistent application of the death penalty and
individualized consideration of the accused.
1. The Quest for Consistency
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the guided discre-
tion statutes at issue in Gregg v. Georgia,25 Proffit v. Florida,2 6
and Jurek v. Texas." Gregg is the principal case. In Gregg, the
defendant was charged with committing armed robbery and
murder. The Georgia statute upheld in Gregg retained the death
penalty for six crimes: murder, armed robbery, rape, treason,
aircraft hijacking, and kidnapping for ransom or where the vic-
tim is harmed.2a The trials were bifurcated; 9 they had a sepa-
24. "[Tlhe constitutional test is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary
standards and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards."
Id. at 175. The Court further noted that "[tihe jury also is a significant and reliable
objective index of contemporary values." Id. at 181.
25. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
26. 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion).
27. 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion).
28. The sections of the Georgia statute applicable to the defendant in Gregg were as
follows:
(a) A person commits murder when he unlawfully and with malice afore-
thought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being. Ex-
press malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fel-
low creature, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof.
Malice shall be implied where no considerable provocation appears, and where all
the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.
(b) A person also commits the crime of murder when in the commission of a
felony he causes the death of another human being, irrespective of malice.
(c) A person convicted of murder shall be punished by death or by imprison-
ment for life.
§ 1, 1968 Ga. Laws 1249 (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (1984)). See also
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162 n.4.
A person commits armed robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he takes prop-
erty of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offen-
sive weapon. The offense robbery by intimidation shall be a lesser included offense in the
offense of armed robbery. A person convicted of armed robbery shall be punished by
death or imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than
20 years.
§ 1, 1969 Ga. Laws 810 (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-41 (1984)). See also
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 163 n.5.
29. A bifurcated trial, one in which the question of sentence is not considered until
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss2/4
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rate guilt and penalty phase. The death penalty could not be
imposed unless one of the ten aggravating circumstances speci-
fied in the statute30 was found applicable to the defendant be-
yond a reasonable doubt.a' In addition, the sentencer was to
the determination of guilt has been made, appears to be constitutionally mandated in
capital cases. As the Supreme Court has noted, a bifurcated trial enables the jury to hear
information relevant to the question of penalty in order to impose a rational sentence
without prejudicing the defendant on the question of guilt. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 191.
Such a "system is more likely to ensure elimination of the constitutional deficiencies
identified in Furman." Id. at 192.
30. The aggravating factors as provided in the statute were:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was commit-
ted by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense
of murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious
assaultive criminal convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was commit-
ted while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or
aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender
was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping know-
ingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by
means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of
more than one person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for
the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or
solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of
his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed
murder as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was commited against any peace officer, corrections
employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped
from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with,
or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of him-
self or another.
Act of March 28, 1973, No. 74, § 3, 1973 Ga. Laws 159, 164-65 (current version at GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1982)). See also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9.
31. The statute also provided:
(c) The statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be warranted by
the evidence shall be given in charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation.
The jury, if its verdict is a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing,
signed by the foreman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances
which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. In nonjury cases the judge shall make
such designation. Except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking, unless at least
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consider additional nonstatutory evidence presented in extenua-
tion, mitigation and aggravation of punishment.2
In Gregg, the jury was given instructions about three of the
statutory aggravating circumstances:
One-That the offense of murder was committed while the
offender was engaged in the commission of two other capital felo-
nies, to-wit the armed robbery.
Two-That the offender committed the offense of murder for
the purpose of receiving money and the automobile described in
the indictment.
Three-The offense of murder was outrageously and wan-
tonly vile, horrible and inhuman, in that they [sic] involved the
depravity of [the] mind of the defendant. 33
The jury found the petitioner guilty of the first and second cir-
cumstances and returned a verdict of death.3 4
The petitioner attacked the statute on several grounds.
First, he claimed that the statute was broad and vague, allowing
for arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty. Spe-
cifically, the petitioner cited the seventh statutory aggravating
circumstance that authorized death if the murder was "outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the vic-
tim. ' 135 The Court disagreed that such language was overly broad
or vague. It expressed confidence that the Georgia courts would
interpret the statute narrowly. The Court stated: "[i]t is, of
course, arguable that any murder involves depravity of mind or
an aggravated battery. But this language need not be construed
in this way, and there is no reason to assume that the Supreme
one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (b) of
this code section is so found, the death penalty shall not be imposed.
Id.
32. Act of March 20, 1974, No. 854, § 7, 1974 Ga. Laws 352, 357 (current version at
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-2 (1982)). The statute provided that the evidence could include
the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilt or pleas of nolo
contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any prior conviction and pleas:
Provided, however, that only such evidence in aggravation as the state has made
known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible.
Id.
33. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 161.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 201.
[Vol. 5:371
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Court of Georgia will adopt such an open-ended construction."3 6
The petitioner also objected to the discretion retained by
the sentencing body under the Georgia statute, arguing that the
requirements of Furman were not satisfied because the jury re-
tained the power to decline to impose the death penalty even if
statutory aggravating circumstances were found.37 The Court,
however, saw no inconsistency between the Furman rule against
arbitrary sentencer discretion and the discretion retained by the
sentencing body under the Georgia statute. Instead, the Court
stated that the petitioner "misinterpreted" Furman:38 Furman
dealt with the decision to impose the death penalty. By contrast,
Gregg dealt with the decision to remove a defendant from con-
sideration as a candidate for the death penalty. " Although the
decision to impose death required the sentencer to be guided by
specific standards, sentencer discretion was constitutionally per-
missible in the decision to impose mercy: "Nothing in any of our
cases suggests that the decision to afford an individual defen-
dant mercy violates the Constitution."4 Thus consistent appli-
cation of the death penalty was not to be a primary goal when
considering mitigating factors.
2. The Legislative Role
Gregg upheld a statutory scheme in which the death penalty
was prohibited unless at least one of the aggravating circum-
stances specified in the statute was applicable to the defen-
dant."' The Court emphasized the importance of the legislature
in the determination of aggravating factors. The legislature was
to act as a crucial limit on the discretion of the jury: "No longer
can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death penalty; it
is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines." '42
A subsequent case, Godfrey v. Georgia,4 seemed to rein-
force Gregg's insistence on the legislative role in determining ag-
36. Id.
37. Id. at 203.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 187
40. Id. at 199.
41. Id. at 162-66. For a list of the 10 aggravating factors, see supra note 30.
42. Id. at 206-07.
43. 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (plurality opinion).
1985]
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gravating factors. Godfrey involved the same Georgia statute up-
held in Gregg. In Godfrey, the petitioner murdered his wife and
mother-in-law and injured his fleeing daughter. The petitioner
had acknowledged when caught: "I've done a hideous crime.'44
At the sentencing hearing the jury imposed the sentence of
death for both of the murder convictions, specifying that the ag-
gravating circumstance for each conviction was "that the offense
of murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhu-
man."45 The Supreme Court reversed, noting that under the
statute, the circumstance only applied to cases which demon-
strated "torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to
the victim."4 Although the Georgia court had appropriately lim-
ited the statute's application in Gregg v. Georgia, it failed to do
so in Godfrey. The prosecutor in Godfrey had stated three times
during the sentencing proceeding that "the case involved no al-
legation of 'torture' or of an 'aggravated battery.' , The Su-
preme Court itself concluded that the petitioner's crimes could
not be said to reflect "a consciousness materially more 'de-
praved' than that of any other person capable of murder."4 The
Court did not hold the statutory aggravating factor invalid per
se, but merely reversed the lower state court's overly broad and
vague interpretation of the factor. Left without an applicable
statutory aggravating factor to support the sentence of death,
the Court vacated the sentence.49
As several commentators have noted, the Court's analysis in
Godfrey suggests that in the absence of specific statutory aggra-
vating circumstances, the death sentence may not be imposed
without a degree of arbitrariness unacceptable under Furman
and Gregg.50 Taken together, Gregg and Godfrey seem to estab-
lish a constitutional imperative for finding at least one legisla-
tively determined aggravating factor. This constitutional imper-
ative stems both from the legislative role as an indicator of the
44. Id. at 426.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 431. For the full text of this aggravating factor, see supra note 30.
47. Id. at 426.
48. Id. at 433.
49. Id. at 429-33.
50. These commentators are listed in Note, supra note 2, at 73 n.113.
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"evolving standards of decency,""1 and from the eighth amend-
ment's procedural requirement that the death penalty be ap-
plied consistently.52
3. The Importance of Individualization
In Woodson v. North Carolina"3 and Roberts v. Louisiana,54
the Supreme Court struck down mandatory death sentences for
51. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
52. This eighth amendment procedural requirement was first identified in Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
53. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). In Woodson, the defendants had been convicted of first
degree murder for their participation in an armed robbery that caused death. The North
Carolina statute authorized mandatory death for all first degree murderers and provided:
Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment. -A [sic] murder which
shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving,
torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or
which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson,
rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder
in the first degree and shall be punished with death. All other kinds of murder
shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and shall be punished by imprison-
ment for a term of not less than two years nor more than life imprisonment in the
State's prison.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285 n.4 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1975)).
54. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). In Roberts, the defendants had been convicted of first de-
gree murder for a killing which occurred during an armed robbery and were sentenced to
death under a mandatory statute. The Louisiana statute provided:
First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated rape or armed robbery; or
(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great bodily
harm upon, a fireman or a peace officer who was engaged in the performance of his
lawful duties; or
(3) Where the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm and has previously been convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a life
sentence; or
(4) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm upon more than one person; for]
(5) When the offender has specific intent to commit murder and has been
offered or has received anything of value for committing the murder.
For the purposes of Paragraph (2) herein, the term peace officer shall be de-
fined and include any constable, sheriff, deputy sheriff, local or state policeman,
game warden, federal law enforcement officer, jail or prison guard, parole officer,
probation officer, judge, district attorney, assistant district attorney or district at-
torney's investigator.
Whoever commits the crime of first degree murder shall be punished by
death.
11
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first degree murderers. The Court rested its decision on a num-
ber of grounds. The Court considered the consistency require-
ment of Furman and Gregg. It acknowledged that mandatory
statutes enacted in response to Furman attempted to sever
standardless discretionary sentencing procedures from death
penalty statutes. The Court nevertheless concluded that
mandatory statutes themselves resulted in an absence of stan-
dards, leading to arbitrary and wanton jury discretion in the im-
position of death.5  Mandatory statutes could not fulfill
"Furman's basic requirement" for consistency.
In both Woodson and Roberts, the Court held that a process
of individualization, which considered mitigating factors, was
constitutionally required. In Woodson, the Court noted that
death is a punishment different from all others in its irrevocabil-
ity. The Court emphasized the importance of a process that ac-
cords significance to considerations of individual "compassionate
or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of hu-
mankind."57 These mitigating factors could not be ignored. Oth-
erwise, as Justice Stewart eloquently lamented, defendants
would become "members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to
be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death," 58
without chance of mercy. Citing the "fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment," the Court stated
that "consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense [is] a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of* inflicting
the penalty of death. ' 59 Individualization was raised to the level
of a constitutional requirement.
4. The Role of the Sentencer
Woodson did not specify whether the authority to deter-
mine and consider mitigating factors lay with the legislature or
with the sentencing body. Two years later, this question was an-
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (1983).
55. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 334-35.
56. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333.
57. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
58. Id.
59. Id.
[Vol. 5:371
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swered by Lockett v. Ohio.s0 In Lockett, the petitioner had been
convicted of aggravated murder. She challenged the Ohio statute
because it did not permit the sentencing judge to consider, "as
mitigating factors, her character, prior record, age, lack of spe-
cific intent to cause death, and her relatively minor part in the
crime."' The Ohio statute was limited to the consideration of
three specific mitigating factors: whether the victim facilitated
the offense, whether the offender was under duress, coercion or
strong provocation, and whether the offender suffered from
mental deficiencies.6 2 Drawing upon Woodson's reasoning, the
60. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
61. Id. at 597.
62. Id. at 589. The challenged statute provided:
Criteria for imposing death or imprisonment for a capital offense.
(A) Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded, un-
less one or more of the following is specified in the indictment or count in the
indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code, and is proved beyond
a reasonable doubt:
(1) The offense was the assassination of the President of the United States or
person in line of succession to the presidency, or of the governor or lieutenant
governor of this state, or of the president-elect or vice president-elect of the
United States, or of the governor-elect or lieutenant governor-elect of this state, or
of a candidate for any of the foregoing offices. For purposes of this division, a
person is a candidate if he has been nominated for election according to law, or if
he has filed a petition or petitions according to law to have his name placed on the
ballot in a primary or general election, or if he campaigns as a write-in candidate
in a primary or general election.
(2) The offense was committed for hire.
(3) The offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, appre-
hension, trial, or punishment for another offense committed by the offender.
(4) The offense was committed while the offender was a prisoner in a deten-
tion facility as defined in § 2921.01 of the Revised Code.
(5) The offender has previously been convicted of an offense of which the gist
was the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill another, committed prior to the
offense at bar, or the offense at bar was part of a course of conduct involving the
purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender.
(6) The victim of the offense was a law enforcement officer whom the offender
knew to be such, and either the victim was engaged in his duties at the time of the
offense, or it was the offender's specific purpose to kill a law enforcement officer.
(7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting
to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kid-
napping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary.
(B) Regardless of whether one or more of the aggravating circumstances listed
in division (A) of this section is specified in the indictment and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded when,
considering the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, character,
and condition of the offender, one or more of the following is established by a
13
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Court in Lockett concluded that the consideration of mitigating
factors could not be limited by statute:
[Tihe Eighth and Fourteenth amendments require that the sen-
tencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defen-
dant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death."3
Once again, the Court stressed the importance of individualiza-
tion, noting that "[t]he need for treating each defendant in a
capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of
the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases."'1
Thus, it is for the trial judge and jury to consider mitigating
evidence. This rule finds its roots in the constitutionally com-
pelled goal of individualization and in the sentencer's position as
an index of contemporary values.6 5
III. The Decline of Consistency as a Constitutional Goal
The examination of sentencer discretion in Lockett led Jus-
tice White, in his dissent, to comment that "[t]he Court has now
completed its about-face since Furman v. Georgia.'"66 Furman
held that unfettered sentencer discretion in capital punishment
prepondence [sic] of the evidence:
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact
that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or
mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of
insanity.
Act of Jan. 1, 1974, § 2929.04, 134 Ohio Laws 1866, 1979-81 (current version at OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (1982)).
63. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (emphasis in original).
64. Id. at 605.
65. Several commentators have interpreted Lockett as suggesting that the defendant
is entitled to a jury trial on the grounds that the jury is a better index of "evolving
standards of decency" and contemporary values than is the trial judge. See Death Pen-
alty, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 99, 108 (1978); Gillers, supra
note 19, at 40-41. But, in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), the Supreme Court
noted that jury sentencing is not constitutionally required and that the trial judge yields
more consistent sentencing results. Id. at 252.
66. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 622 (White, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 7-15 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 5:371
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss2/4
CAPITAL SENTENCING
was unconstitutional. Yet Lockett seemed to be requiring com-
plete sentencer discretion, compelling a "restoration of the state
of affairs at the time Furman was decided. 6 7 Recently, a com-
mentator agreed with Justice White's dissent, noting that "[t]he
jurisprudence of death has come almost full circle. '6 8 Other
commentators, however, find no inherent contradictions in the
Court's bifurcated analysis, reasoning that the eighth amend-
ment requires "reliability and guided discretion in the decision
to impose death, but not in the decision to afford mercy by im-
posing a noncapital sentence." 9 They argue that Lockett is "en-
tirely consistent with Furman ...because it grants broad sen-
tencer discretion only on the mitigating and not on the
aggravating side of the sentencing equation. 7 0
The argument that Lockett is consistent with Furman has a
superficial soundness. It assumes, however, that there are two
separate and distinct endeavors: (1) the quest to achieve consis-
tent application of aggravating factors, and (2) the drive toward
individualization through the consideration of mitigating factors.
Such is not the case. An examination of the composition of ag-
gravating and mitigating factors suggests that the Court is in-
jecting a new element of individualization into the definition and
purpose of aggravating factors. Clearly, the Court is granting
sentencer discretion on the aggravating side of the sentencing
equation, thereby reducing the likelihood that these aggravating
factors can be consistently applied. The use of nonstatutory ag-
gravating factors, and the frequent overlap and confusion of ag-
gravating and mitigating factors, further blur the distinction be-
tween the drives toward consistency and individualization. The
blurring of this distinction undercuts the probability of achiev-
ing reliability and guided discretion in the decision to impose
death. Without reliability and guided discretion, there does in-
deed seem to be "a restoration of the state of affairs at the time
Furman was decided. 7 1 Without consistent application of the
death penalty, capital punishment becomes an impermissible
67. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 623 (White, J., dissenting).
68. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1154 (1980).
69. Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 21, at 376.
70. Id. at 374.
71. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 623 (White, J., dissenting).
19851
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punishment.
A. Individualization as a Constitutional Goal in the Forma-
tion and Application of Aggravating Factors
The Supreme Court has upheld guided discretion statutes
that require the sentencing body to consider relevant mitigating
and aggravating factors to determine an appropriate penalty. 2
The Court has defined mitigating factors as those that address
some aspect of the defendant's character, prior record, or the
circumstances of his offense.7 3 The Court, however, has not ex-
amined the composition of aggravating factors closely; it has not
placed many constitutional limits on what may be considered an
aggravating factor. The Court appears to have given the legisla-
ture a free hand in deciding the content and relevance of aggra-
vating factors. In Gregg v. Georgia7 4 the Court extolled the leg-
islative authority to determine aggravating factors, noting that
the jury should be given guidance regarding the factors, which
the state legislature, "representing organized society, deems par-
ticularly relevant to the sentencing decision. '75 Perhaps only one
traditional judicial mandate for statutory aggravating factors is
clear: they must be applied with consistency.7 '
Despite the traditional reluctance of the Court to define ag-
gravating factors, recent Supreme Court cases appear to do just
that. In Enmund v. Florida7 7 California v. Ramos," and Zant v.
Stephens, 9 the Supreme Court ties the content of aggravating
factors to individualized consideration of the defendant, his
72. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
73. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1976); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982).
74. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
75. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192.
76. Even here, however, one commentator feels that the Court has interpreted "con-
sistency" broadly, not taking problems of facial statutory overbreadth or vagueness too
seriously. See Radin, supra note 68, at 1153. For example, in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976), where the defendant was sentenced to death for the rape and strangulation of
a young girl, the Court allowed as an aggravating factor the probability that the defen-
dant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society. Radin finds this factor vague and speculative.
77. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
78. 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
79. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
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background, and the circumstances of his offense. By incorporat-
ing this new element of individualization into the definition of
aggravating factors, the Supreme Court seems to have all but
abandoned its oft-asserted goal of consistent application of the
death penalty.
1. Enmund v. Florida
In Enmund v. Florida,"0 the Supreme Court held that the
death penalty was a disproportionate penalty when inflicted on a
mere accomplice to a murder who had not actually killed nor
intended.to kill." Enmund had been tried for the robbery and
fatal shooting of two elderly people. At the sentencing hearing,
the trial judge expressly found that "the armed robbery was
planned ahead of time by the defendant Enmund. . . and that
he had shot each of the victims while they lay prone in order to
eliminate them as witnesses."82 In addition, the court found that
Enmund had actively participated in an attempt to avoid detec-
tion by disposing of the murder weapons.8 3 The judge concluded
that there were no mitigating factors and four statutory aggra-
vating factors applicable: (1) the capital felonies were committed
while the defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in the
commission of an armed robbery, (2) the felonies were commit-
ted for pecuniary gain, (3) the felonies were heinous, atrocious
and cruel, and (4) the defendant had been previously convicted
of a violent felony. 4 Enmund was sentenced to death.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the death
sentence, although it disagreed with the trial court's finding of
the facts.' The Florida Supreme Court determined that Enmund
had not planned the robbery and did not shoot the victims.85
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court found that the death
penalty was a proper sentence because Enmund's role as driver
of the get-away car made him a principal in the second degree.
He was " 'constructively present aiding and abetting the com-
80. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
81. Id. at 786-88.
82. Id. at 829 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 785.
85. See id. at 786.
1985]
17
PACE LAW REVIEW
mission of the crime of robbery'" at which a killing occurred."'
The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that the interaction of the
law of principals and the felony murder rule serves to impute
the lethal acts of a felon to his co-felon. 7 Thus, Enmund was
properly convicted of first degree murder, which made him eligi-
ble for the death penalty under Florida law.88 Although the Flor-
ida Supreme Court rejected two of the statutory aggravating fac-
tors relied upon by the trial judge,89 it upheld the death
sentence because the remaining two statutory aggravating fac-
tors applied. The aggravating circumstances relied upon were:
(1) the capital felonies were committed while the defendant was
an accomplice in an armed robbery; and (2) the defendant had a
prior conviction of robbery involving violence.90
On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the Florida Su-
preme Court. The Court's broad opinion held that the death
penalty cannot be imposed on a mere accomplice to a murder if
he did not take life nor intend to take life.9 Although the Court
did not directly address the constitutionality of the statutory ag-
gravating factor allowing death to be imposed on a mere accom-
plice to a robbery, its sweeping opinion can be read as invalidat-
ing such a factor, at least if used as the sole basis for a decision
to impose capital punishment. After all, the death penalty can-
not be imposed on an accomplice under the felony-murder rule
who did not himself kill nor intend to kill. How then can we
impose death if authorized solely by an aggravating factor speci-
86. Id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1370 (Fla. 1981)).
87. Id. Under Florida's felony murder rule, the perpetration or attempted perpetra-
tion of and intent to commit a felony during which a murder occurs is sufficient to sus-
tain a murder conviction. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a) (West Supp. 1984). The
included felonies under Florida law are limited to trafficking, arson, sexual battery, bur-
glary, robbery, kidnapping, escape, aircraft piracy, destructive device or bomb. Id. §
782.04(2).
88. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a) (West Supp. 1984); id. § 775.082(1) (West
1976 and Supp. 1983).
89. Enmund, 458 U.S at 787. The Florida Supreme Court felt that the factor, "kill-
ing for pecuniary gain" overlapped with the factor of killing during an armed robbery.
The court therefore excluded it for repetitiveness. The court also found that the aggra-
vating factor of "heinous, atrocious and cruel" killings was not applicable to Enmund, for
he had not in fact been the one to kill the victims. The factor was excluded for overly
broad application. Id.
90. Id. at 785. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(b),(d),(f),(h) (West Supp. 1984).
91. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
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fying that the defendant was a mere accomplice to a killing? 2
Thus, in Enmund, the Supreme Court essentially dictated
guidelines for defining aggravating factors in the capital sentenc-
ing process.
The Enmund Court adopted an analysis similar to that
which the Court had used in Coker v. Georgia,93 when it held
that the death penalty was excessive punishment for the crime
of rape. In Enmund, the Court engaged in a lengthy examina-
tion of legislative determinations about the appropriateness of
authorizing the death penalty solely for participating in a rob-
bery in which another robber takes a life. 4 Whether the Court
conclusively proves a legislative repudiation of the death penalty
for one such as Enmund is debatable.9 Yet, the legislative opin-
92.FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(d).
93. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
94. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789-94. Of 36 state and federal jurisdictions authorizing
the death penalty, the Court noted that only nine jurisdictions authorized the imposition
of the death penalty solely for participation in a robbery in which another robber takes
life. According to the Court's compiliation, the nine jurisdictions are:California, Florida,
Georgia, Mississippi, Nevada, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
at 789 n.5.
95. The Court concluded that only nine jurisdictions authorized the death penalty
in such a situation, and that legislative decisions weighed "on the side of rejecting capital
punishment for the crime at issue." Id. at 793. Yet there are several disturbing aspects to
the Court's analysis. In the first place, the use of state by state comparisons to strike
down a particular statute may be less than convincing if one considers the principle of
federalism. Even if only nine of the 36 jurisdictions authorizing the death penalty permit
its imposition in a situation like Enmund, perhaps these nine jurisdictions should be
respected. Secondly, and more importantly, the Court's use of statistics falls far short of
demonstrating a national legislative mandate against capital punishment in this case.
The Court itself admits that the current legislative judgments are not "as compelling as
the legislative judgments considered in Coker," id., in which Georgia was the only juris-
diction in the United States to authorize the death penalty if the rape victim was an
adult woman. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 595-96.
In fact, it is not clear that only nine jurisdictions imposed the death penalty on a
defendant who did not commit the homicidal act. Eleven states - not nine - wrote as
amici curiae on Florida's behalf before the Supreme Court. They were Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, and
Utah. Moreover, Justice O'Connor's dissent cites 20 statutes which permit imposition of
the death penalty in this situation. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 820 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The plurality opinion dismisses Justice O'Connor's figures by claiming that these other
jurisdictions require an intent to kill before death will be imposed. Enmund, 458 U.S. at
789.
Furthermore, the Court's discussion of mitigating circumstances in the various state
statutes is somewhat misleading. The Court notes that "six . . .States make it a statu-
tory mitigating circumstance that the defendant was an accomplice in a capital felony
19
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ions about the appropriateness of death are ultimately not the
point. As the Court finally asserts: "It is for us ultimately to
judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the
death penalty. '9 6 The Court concludes that the eighth amend-
ment does not permit imposition of the death penalty when the
defendant has not himself killed nor intended to kill.
In explaining its decision the Court observes:
The question before us . . .is the validity of capital punishment
for Enmund's own conduct. The focus must be on his culpability,
not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot the
victims, for we insist on "individualized consideration as a consti-
tutional requirement in imposing the death sentence," . . . which
means that we must focus on "relevant facets of the character
and record of the individual offender."9
Although individualization has been repeatedly cited as the ba-
sis for the decision to impose mercy, Enmund reveals the Su-
preme Court holding for the first time that individualization in
the formation and application of aggravating factors is a consti-
tutional requirement in the decision to impose death.
2. California v. Ramos
This new emphasis on individualization in the formation
and application of aggravating factors does not appear to be a
passing fancy. California v. Ramos,98 decided a few months after
Enmund, indicates that the Supreme Court will go to great
committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor." Id. at 791-92
(emphasis in original). The Court then cites the statutes of Connecticut, Indiana, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Arizona, and North Carolina. Id. at 792 n.12. Although it is not men-
tioned, the Florida statute at issue in Enmund also allows the defendant's minor partici-
pation as an accomplice to a capital felony committed by another person to be
considered a statutory mitigating factor. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(d) (West Supp.
1984). Thus, the mere fact of Enmund's participation would not necessitate the imposi-
tion of death if such participation were minor. In fact, it is this statutory mitigating
circumstance which constitutes the basis of the dissent's argument to remand the case to
the trial Court: "In his erroneous belief that the petitioner had shot both of the victims
... in order to eliminate them as witnesses, the trial judge necessarily rejected the only
argument offered in mitigation, that the petitioner's role in the capital felonies was mi-
nor ...." Enmund, 458 U.S. at 830.
96. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 798 (emphasis in original).
98. 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983).
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lengths to uphold a legislative factor with an aggravating effect
precisely because it focuses on the individual. In Ramos, the de-
fendant had been convicted of first degree murder. During the
penalty phase of the defendant's trial, California law required a
jury instruction, known as the Briggs Instruction,99 to inform the
jury that a sentence of life without possibility of parole might in
the future be commuted by the governor to permit parole. 00
Coming as the penultimate factor in a list of aggravating and
mitigating factors, the instruction in Ramos had an aggravating
effect. The jury sentenced the defendant to death.
The California Supreme Court concluded that the Briggs
Instruction was unconstitutional, for it injected an entirely irrel-
evant and speculative factor into the sentencing proceedings by
focusing on the possible behavior of a present or future gover-
nor. In addition, the court found the instruction to be biased, for
it told the jurors only "half the story."10' 1 The instruction did not
inform the jury that a death sentence, like a sentence of life
without parole, could similarly be commuted or modified by the
governor. 102
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.10 3  Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion explained that the Briggs Instruc-
tion did not lead the jury to speculate whether a future governor
would commute a life sentence. Instead, the instruction invited
the jury to assess whether the defendant was someone whose
probable future behavior made it undesirable that he be permit-
ted to return to society.'0 4 Thus, the jury's deliberation was in a
sense "individualized' 1 5 because it considered this aggravating
99. Named after the senator who supported it, the "Briggs Instruction" was incorpo-
rated into the California Penal Code as a result of a 1978 voter initiative popularly
known as the Briggs Initiative. See Ramos, 103 S. Ct. at 3450 nn.3-4.
100. The judge in Ramos delivered the following instruction:
You are instructed that under the State Constitution a Governor is empowered to
grant a reprieve, pardon, or commutation of a sentence following conviction of a
crime. Under this power a governor may in the future commute a sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole to a lesser sentence that would include
the possibility of parole.
Ramos, 103 S. Ct. at 3450.
101. People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 597 (1982).
102. Id. at 596.
103. California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983).
104. See California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. at 3455.
105. See id.
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Justice Blackmun's dissent characterized the majority opin-
ion as an "intellectual sleight of hand of legal analysis."' s Re-
gardless of whether we accept Justice O'Connor's interpretation
of the Briggs Instruction, it is interesting to note that instead of
turning to questions of reliability or consistency - the usual
justifications for upholding statutory factors with an aggravating
effect - the opinion invokes individualization as the basis for
the validity of this aggravating factor. The opinion cites various
Supreme Court cases to support its emphasis upon individuali-
zation, failing to note that these cases all concern mitigating, not
aggravating factors.' °
3. Zant v. Stephens
The Supreme Court reiterated the role of individualization
in the context of aggravating factors in Zant v. Stephens.08
There the defendant had been sentenced to death for murder
after the jury found three statutory aggravating factors applica-
ble. 109 One of the factors was subsequently held unconstitution-
106. Id. at 3468 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 3452-53. The Court cites Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Woodson held that mandatory death penalty
statutes were unconstitutional because they prevented the consideration of mitigating
factors. In Lockett, the Court held that the legislature could not preclude the sentencer
from considering mitigating factors. Mitigating evidence was necessary to assure the con-
stitutionally mandated goal of individualized consideration of the defendant. See supra
notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
108. Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983).
109. Id. at 2738. See also Act of March 28, 1973, No. 74, § 3, 1973 Ga. Laws 159,
164-65 (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1982)), which provided, in part:
In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized,
the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to
consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise au-
thorized by law and any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances
which may be supported by the evidence:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed
by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of
murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious as-
saultive criminal convictions. . ..
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. . ..
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped
from the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss2/4
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ally vague.1"' Despite the jury's reliance on an unconstitutional
statutory aggravating factor, the Supreme Court affirmed the
death sentence, emphasizing and lauding specific features of the
Georgia sentencing scheme that focused on individualization.
The Court noted that the Georgia sentencing scheme did not de-
mand a balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors in which
reliance on an additional invalid statutory aggravating factor
might tip the scales toward death. Instead, the Georgia sentenc-
ing scheme used statutory aggravating factors to "circumscribe
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty." ' After this
initial class was selected, all other aggravating factors, whether
constitutionally permissible or not, could be considered "in the
process of selecting . .. those defendants who will actually be
sentenced to death." '112 To identify the goal in this final selection
for death, the Court again quoted opinions dealing with mitigat-
ing, not aggravating, factors and concluded: "What is important
at the selection stage is an individualized determination on the
basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of
the crime. 11 3 Taken together, Enmund, Ramos and Stephens
The jury in Stephens found the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (1) and (9)
applicable to the defendant. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. at 2738.
110. While the defendant's appeal was pending, the Georgia Supreme Court held, in
Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976), that the aggravating circumstance of
"a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions" was unconstitutionally
vague. Id. at 539-40, 224 S.E.2d 391-92. This language was part of the first factor the jury
relied upon in sentencing Stephens. See supra note 109.
111. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, at 2743 (1983). In response to a certified question
from the Supreme Court on the role of statutory aggravating factors in the Georgia sen-
tencing scheme, the Georgia Supreme Court compared the law of homicide to a pyramid.
As the Georgia court explained, all cases of homicide are within the pyramid, but those
cases qualifying for the death penalty are contained only in the space below the apex. To
reach that category, a case must pass through three planes of division. The first plane
separates murder cases from other homicide cases. The second separates from all murder
cases those for which the penalty of death is a possible punishment. This plane is estab-
lished by statutory aggravating factors. No case can rise above this plane in Georgia
unless there is at least one statutory aggravating factor. Act of March 28, 1973, No. 74, §
3, 1973 Ga. Laws 159, 164-65 (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(c) (1982)).
The final plane picks out those cases in which death is actually imposed. All evidence is
considered here by the sentencer. Zant v. Stephens, 250 Ga. 97, 99-100, 197 S.E.2d 1, 3-4
(1982). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-2, -30 (1982).
112. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. at 2743.
113. Id. at 2743-44 (emphasis original). In addition to citing Woodson v. North Car-
olina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (pluality opinion), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)
(plurality opinion), the Court also cites Eddings v. Oklahoma 455 U.S. 104 (1982). For a
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seem to introduce and applaud a new concern with individuali-
zation in the composition and application of aggravating factors.
4. The Conflict Between Individualization and Consis-
tency in the Context of Aggravating Factors
At first glance it might seem that there is nothing improper
with individualization in the context of aggravating factors. Cer-
tainly it cannot be wrong to focus upon specific characteristics of
the defendant, his background and his crime, before making a
decision as irrevocable as imposing the death penalty. The prob-
lem with the Supreme Court's new emphasis upon individualiza-
tion in the formation and application of aggravating factors is
that it is difficult to reconcile this type of individualization with
the constitutional requirement that aggravating factors be ap-
plied consistently. The Supreme Court is requiring that statu-
tory aggravating factors include individualized criteria. These
factors must focus on individual defendants, who vary from case
to case, but still must be applied consistently. The question is:
"How can this be done"? The Court is merging the goals of indi-
vidualization and consistency, apparently not realizing that
there is an inherent conflict in striving to achieve both these
goals in the context of aggravating factors. We cannot simulta-
neously achieve both individualization and consistency on the
aggravating side of the sentencing equation.
In fact, the Supreme Court is not attempting to achieve
both goals. Instead, the Court is minimizing the goal of consis-
tency. After all, the individualized consideration of every defen-
dant necessitates a great deal of sentencer discretion. Only when
the sentencing body is given flexibility can we ensure that it
fully focuses on the relevant characteristics of the defendant and
his uniqueness as an individual. Now sentencer discretion is on
the aggravating side of the sentencing equation. Such a scheme
is familiar. It harkens back to the pre-Furman days, when dis-
cretionary sentencing resulted in the arbitrary and capricious
imposition of death, to the days when there was "no meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which death [was] im-
discussion of Eddings, see infra notes 130-135 and accompanying text.
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posed from the many cases in which it [was] not,"' 14 and when it
became impossible to impose the death penalty with
consistency.
B. The Effect of Nonstatutory Aggravating Factors upon Con-
sistent Application of the Death Penalty
Even if the Supreme Court were to reinstate consistency as
the primary constitutional goal of aggravating factors, the possi-
bility of achieving consistency would be undercut by the exis-
tence and influence of nonstatutory aggravating factors. A recent
Supreme Court case, Barclay v. Florida,'15 addresses the role of
nonstatutory aggravating factors in the sentencing proceeding.
In Barclay, the petitioner was convicted for a racially motivated
murder. 16 Although the jury recommended a sentence of life im-
prisonment for the petitioner, the trial judge sentenced the peti-
tioner to death.11 7 In sentencing the petitioner, the judge found
that several statutory aggravating factors were present. 118 The
judge declared that no mitigating factors were present because
Barclay had an extensive criminal record.' The judge found
that the petitioner's criminal record was a nonstatutory aggra-
vating circumstance, despite the fact that Florida law prohibited
114. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
115. Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983) (plurality opinion).
116. Id. at 3420-22.
117. Under Florida law, the jury's verdict is only advisory. The actual sentence is
determined by the trial judge. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2) (West Supp. 1984). Both jury
and judge weigh mitigating factors against aggravating factors to arrive at a sentencing
decision. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West Supp. 1984). No sentence can be imposed
unless "(a) sufficient aggravating circumstances exist . . . and (b) there are insufficient
mitigating circumstances . . . to outweigh the aggravating circumstances." FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.141(3)(a), (b) (West Supp. 1984). The statute was construed by the Florida
Supreme Court to permit consideration of any mitigating circumstance, not just statu-
tory mitigating circumstances. Petitioner's motion for rehearing in light of Lockett was
denied in Songer v. State, 365 So. 2d 696, 700 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 956
(1979).
118. Barclay, 103 S. Ct. at 3421. The trial judge found that Barclay had knowingly
created a great risk of death to many persons, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(c), had com-
mitted the murder while engaged in a kidnapping, id. § 921.141(5)(d), had endeavored to
disrupt governmental functions and law enforcement, id. § 921.141(5)(g), and had been
especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. Id. § 921.141(5)(h).
119. Barclay 103 S. Ct. at 3421. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(a) (West Supp. 1984),
provided that the absence of a significant history of prior criminal activity was a mitigat-
ing factor.
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considering a defendant's prior criminal record as an aggravating
circumstance.120 The judge also considered racial hatred as a sec-
ond nonstatutory aggravating factor. He discussed the defen-
dant's racial motive for the killing and compared it to the Nazi
atrocities the judge had witnessed during World War II.121
The Supreme Court affirmed Barclay's death sentence. It
concluded that a sentence based on both statutory and nonstat-
utory aggravating factors did not impermissibly upset the bal-
ancing process established by the Florida statute and suffered
no constitutional defect.122 The Court's conclusion is disturbing.
120. Barclay, 103 S. Ct. at 3422.
121. The judge explained:
My 28 years of legal experience have been almost exclusively in the field of Crimi-
nal Law. I have been a defense attorney in criminal cases, an Advisor to the Public
Defender's Office, a prosecutor for eight and one-half years and a Criminal Court
and Circuit Court Judge - Felony Division - for almost 10 years. During these
28 years I have defended, prosecuted and held trial in almost every type of serious
crime.
Because of this extensive experience, I believe I have come to know and un-
derstand when or when not, a crime is heinous, atrocious and cruel and deserving
of the maximum possible sentence.
My experience with the sordid, tragic and violent side of life has not been
confined to the Courtroom. I, like so many American Combat Infantry Soldiers,
walked the battlefields of Europe and saw thousands of dead American and Ger-
man soldiers and I witnessed the concentration camps where innocent civilians
and children were murdered in a war of racial and religious extermination.
To attempt to initiate such a race war in this country is too horrible to con-
template for both our black and white citizens. Such an attempt must be dealt
with by just and swift legal process and when justified by Jury verdict of
guilty - then to terminate and remove permanently from society those who
would choose to initiate this diabolical course.
HAD THE DEFENDANT BEEN EXPOSED TO THE CARNAGE OF THE
BATTLEFIELDS AND THE HORRORS OF THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS
INSTEAD OF MOVIES, TELEVISION PROGRAMS AND REVOLUTIONARY
TRACTS GLORIFYING VIOLENCE AND RACIAL STRIFE - THEN PER-
HAPS HIS THOUGHTS AND ACTIONS WOULD HAVE TAKEN A LESS VI-
OLENT COURSE.
Having set forth my personal experiences above, it is understandable that I
am not easily shocked or moved by tragedy - but this present murder and call
for racial war is especially shocking and meets every definition of heinous, atro-
cious and cruel. The perpetrator thereby forfeits further right to life - for cer-
tainly his life is no more sacred than that of the innocent eighteen year old victim,
Stephen Anthony Orlando.
Barclay, 103 S. Ct. at 3423 n.6.
122. Id. at 3427-28. The Court noted:
We have never suggested that the United States Constitution requires that
the sentencing process should be transformed into a rigid and mechanical parsing
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss2/4
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Nonstatutory aggravating factors add an element of arbitrari-
ness and capriciousness into the sentencing process. Indeed, by
their very nature, nonstatutory aggravating factors cannot be
consistently applied, because they vary greatly from case to
case. 12 3 As Justice Marshall's dissent in Barclay explains:
Fairness and consistency cannot be achieved if non-statutory ag-
gravating circumstances are randomly introduced into the bal-
ance. If one judge follows the law in sentencing a capital defen-
dant but another judge injects into the weighing process any
number of non-statutory factors in aggravation, or if the same
judge selectively relies on such circumstances, the fate of an indi-
vidual defendant will inevitably depend on whether on a given
day his sentencer happened to respect the constraints imposed by
Florida law. The decision to execute a human being surely should
not depend on such pot luck. 24
By approving the use of nonstatutory aggravating factors, the
Supreme Court again minimizes the importance of consistency
as a constitutional goal in capital sentencing.
A sentence, such as Barclay's, based upon both statutory
and nonstatutory aggravating factors, does not assure consistent
application of the death penalty. Nevertheless, it may provide
some sort of legislative guidance to the sentencing
body - albeit scant guidance. The Court's line of decisions can
be read to imply that a sentence based entirely upon nonstatu-
of statutory aggravating factors. But to attempt to separate the sentencer's deci-
sion from his experiences would inevitably do precisely that. It is entirely fitting
for the moral, factual, and legal judgment of judges and juries to play a meaning-
ful role in sentencing. We expect that sentencers will exercise their discretion in
their own way and to the best of their ability. As long as that discretion is guided
in a constitutionally adequate way .... and as long as the decision is not so
wholly arbitrary as to offend the Constitution, the Eighth Amendment cannot and
should not demand more.
Id. at 3424 (citation omitted).
123. Perhaps the influence of nonstatutory aggravating factors can perhaps be felt
more keenly in situations where a single jury in a bifurcated trial sits at both the guilt
and sentencing stages of the trial. All evidence presented in the guilt determination may
and will be consciously conjured up and considered by the jury in their sentencing deter-
mination. The sentencing determination thus becomes greatly swayed by nonstatutory
aggravating evidence, evidence about which the jury has received no sentencing guidance
as mandated by Furman.
124. Barclay, 103 S. Ct. at 3443 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
19851
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tory aggravating factors would be declared invalid.125 At first
glance, Barclay would seem to support this inference, for the
Court asserts that its previous opinions "may properly be read
to question the propriety of a sentence based entirely on non-
statutory aggravating factors. ' 26 The Court's words are not en-
tirely reassuring, however. The Court does not unequivocally
state that a sentence based entirely upon nonstatutory aggravat-
ing factors would be unconstitutional because it would lack leg-
islative guidance, and thus be devoid of the consistency man-
dated by Furman. Instead, the Court notes that a sentence
based upon nonstatutory aggravating factors would only be an
"impropriety". 12 7 The sentence would merely be open to "ques-
tion". Thus, the Supreme Court has not declared a sentence
based entirely upon nonstatutory aggravating factors
unconstitutional.1 28
C. The Overlap of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
The bifurcated due process analysis invoked by the Su-
preme Court assumes that aggravating and mitigating factors
can be readily distinguished from one another. Statutory aggra-
vating and mitigating factors might be distinguishable. After all,
they are laid out by statute. It is more difficult, however, to sep-
arate nonstatutory aggravating factors from mitigating factors. A
single circumstance can be characterized as either aggravating or
mitigating. Consideration of a nonstatutory agfravating circum-
stance which may also be interpreted as a mitigating circum-
125. Gillers, supra note 19, at 23 n.108.
126. Barclay, 103 S. Ct. at 3428. In addition, the Supreme Court in Zant v. Ste-
phens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983), noted approvingly that under the Georgia statute, a defen-
dant could only be eligible for the death penalty if at least one statutory aggravating
factor were found. Id. at 2742. The Court did not, however, explicitly state that one
statutory aggravating factor is always constitutionally compelled before death can be
imposed.
127. See Barclay, 103 S. Ct. at 3428.
128. See id. But cf. Ledowitz, The New Role of Statutory Aggravating Circum-
stances, 22 DuQ. L. REV. 317, 348 (1984). This commentator concludes that a sentence
based entirely upon nonstatutory factors would not be allowed. He points to Justice Ste-
vens' statement that "a death sentence may not rest solely on a nonstatutory aggravating
factor." However, it is important to note that Justice Stevens' statement was not
adopted by the plurality. Thus, the Supreme Court has not explicitly condemned a sen-
tence based entirely on nonstatutory aggravating factors.
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stance has grave consequences for the consistent application of
the death penalty.
Consider one possible scenario: a defense attorney, drawing
attention to the "uniqueness of the individual" as mandated by
Woodson and Lockett 129 presents evidence concerning the fre-
quent intoxication and drunken sprees of his client. The attor-
ney hopes this evidence will be considered as a mitigating factor.
He may argue, "the defendant had no control over his behav-
ior," or, attempting to be more persuasive, "he was driven to
drink by the unbearable circumstances of his unhappy life." The
trial judge or jury, however, may view the evidence differently,
looking at it as an aggravating factor - as proof of the defen-
dant's low moral character, or as a prediction of his future
drunkenness and criminal behavior. Consideration of mitigating
evidence as a nonstatutory aggravating factor increases the risk
that capital punishment will be imposed inconsistently, arbitrar-
ily and unconstitutionally. This result is contrary to the Su-
preme Court's stated goal of achieving consistency through the
application of aggravating factors.
The treatment of evidence that can be viewed as aggravat-
ing or mitigating is further confused by the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Eddings v. Oklahoma.' In Eddings, the Supreme
Court addressed the trial court's treatment of mitigating evi-
dence profferred by the defendant. A sixteen-year-old defendant
had been convicted of first degree murder for killing a police of-
ficer. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel presented sub-
stantial evidence of Eddings' troubled youth. His parents had
been divorced when Eddings was five years old. By the time he
was fourteen he could no longer be controlled by his mother. He
was subjected to physical punishment by his father. In addition,
state psychiatrists testified that Eddings was emotionally
disturbed.' 31
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge weighed
the aggravating and mitigating factors against one another. Con-
sidering the evidence that had been offered, the judge found
that Eddings' youth was the only mitigating factor of substantial
129. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
130. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
131. Id. at 107.
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weight. The judge opined that, in following the law, the court
could not consider the fact of this young man's violent back-
ground as other potentially mitigating evidence. 132
Although neither the opinion of the court of appeals nor
Eddings' own petition for certiorari discussed the Lockett deci-
sion, the Supreme Court nonetheless addressed the issue of
whether the trial court's apparent dismissal of evidence offered
in mitigation was consistent with the Lockett ruling. 133 The Su-
preme Court held that it was not. Instead, the Court concluded
that the sentencer - like the legislature in Lockett - could
not refuse the defendant consideration of any relevant mitigat-
ing evidence. The Supreme Court required that the sentencer
" 'not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of the defendant's character or record and any of the cir-
cumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death.' ",134 In other words, factors prof-
fered as mitigating by the defendant must be considered as such
by the sentencing body.135 To do otherwise is to risk an uncon-
stitutional "preclusion" of mitigating factors. Thus, in the
"drunkenness" scenario sketched above, the sentencing body
would have to disregard its fears that drunkenness bespeaks a
dangerous, immoral criminal element. Instead, the sentencer
would have to accept the defendant's proposition that his
132. Id. at 109. The statute provided: "In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may
be presented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any of the aggravating circum-
stances enumerated in this act." OKLA. STAT., tit. 21, § 701.10 (1980) (current version at
OKLA STAT., tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 1983)).
The statute further provided that
[ulnless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in this
act is [found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt] or if it is found that any such
aggravating circumstance is outweighed by the finding of one or more mitigating
circumstances, the death penalty shall not be imposed.
OKLA. STAT., tit. 21, § 701.11. (1980) (current version at OKLA. STAT., tit. 21, § 701.11
(West 1983)).
133. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113. The Lockett Court had ruled that the legislature
could not preclude sentencer consideration of mitigating factors by excluding such fac-
tors from the statute. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
134. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110 (emphasis in original) (quoting plurality opinion in
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604).
135. See id. But see Raulerson v. Wainwright, 732 F.2d 803, 806-07 (11th Cir. 1984)
(holding that the constitution prescribes only that the sentencer consider all mitigating
evidence; and that there is no requirement that the court agree with the defendant's view
that the evidence is mitigating).
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drunken sprees are a product of an unhappy life, mitigating
against imposing a death sentence.
One can even use this interpretation of Eddings when the
defendant offers mitigating evidence that conflicts with statu-
tory aggravating factors. If Eddings is taken literally, it would
seem that the defendant's interpretation of the factors should
prevail. Thus, even if drunkenness were statutorily enshrined as
an aggravating factor, it is possible that the defendant's insis-
tence on its mitigating weight would have to be heeded. This
result would nullify the effectiveness of statutory aggravating
factors in the face of a challenge from the defendant, rendering
their consistent application impossible. Thus the overlap of ag-
gravating and mitigating factors thwarts the consistent applica-
tion of the death penalty in both versions of the scenario.
IV. Conclusion
Since Furman v. Georgia,'36 the Supreme Court has main-
tained that a death sentence may be imposed only if the state
follows procedures designed to ensure reliability in the sentenc-
ing process. However, it would seem that consistent application
of the death penalty cannot be accomplished. By the terms of its
own analysis, the Supreme Court has allowed its concern for in-
dividualization to engulf its concern for consistency. In Enmund
v. Florida,'37 California v. Ramos, 38 and Zant v. Stephens, 39
the Court noted that individualized consideration of aggravating
factors is constitutionally required in order to impose the death
penalty." The grant of discretion on the aggravating side of the
sentencing equation inherent in this requirement leaves the sen-
tencer free to disregard legislative guidance. It returns the capi-
tal sentencing process to the arbitrary sentencing of pre-Furman
days. In addition, the Court's approval of a sentence based upon
both statutory and nonstatutory aggravating factors condones
the use of nonstatutory aggravating factors in the sentencing
proceeding. Nonstatutory aggravating factors further threaten
136. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curium).
137. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
138. 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
139. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
140. See supra notes 77-114 and accompanying text.
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consistent application of the death penalty. Finally, the confus-
ing overlap of aggravating and mitigating factors appears to
thwart all hope of achieving consistency. Eddings v. Oklahoma
can be read to mandate that evidence proffered to mitigate the
sentence must be given some weight by the sentencing body.
The Court's holding could nullify the effective, consistent appli-
cation of statutory aggravating factors in the face of a defen-
dant's challenge that these factors should be interpreted as miti-
gating. Unless the constitutionally mandated goal of consistency
is preserved, death becomes an impermissible punishment,
"cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by light-
ning is cruel and unusual."' The Court has come full circle to
the state of the law before Furman was decided.
Karen Appel Oshman t
141. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972). See also supra notes 7-15 and
accompanying text.
t The author is a candidate for a J.D. degree from Yale Law School. She will gradu-
ate in May, 1985.
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